Round 1 fixed the address pre-emption chain by letting a later registration replace the password on
an unverified account and delete its outstanding verify tokens. Round 2 read that code and showed it
was worse than what it fixed, so it goes back out.
It closes nothing. The rule is symmetric and an attacker can simply register last — on a timer,
inside the five-per-five-minutes budget — while the owner registers once. What it does add is two
primitives an unauthenticated caller did not have: overwrite a real registrant's chosen password,
and delete the confirmation link already sitting in their inbox (the approval mail's 7-day token is
an ordinary verify token, so the blanket delete took that too). Worst of all it fired on the rows
SEC-10 left stripped — password_hash NULL, password_revoked_at set, active — installing an
attacker's password where the entire state means "there is none", and clearing the stamp that is the
only reason password-reset still accepts them. That is a straight takeover which did not exist
before, in the code written to prevent one.
The owner's recourse needed no new primitive and already worked: password-reset accepts a
pre-empted account, proves the mailbox, rewrites the hash and bumps the session epoch. What remains
is the bounded window between a confirmation click and that reset, which is SEC-16 — logged with
this attempt written down, so the next person does not reach for it again.
Two smaller round-2 findings go with it. `upsert_pending_invite`'s new exact-spelling tie-break ran
before any status preference, so it could deterministically pick a DENIED sibling over a pending one
and reopen it — the very outcome its comment claimed to prevent; the status preference now comes
first. And `send_invitation` activated the account before the send it might have to report as
failed, so a request the UI called a failure had quietly let someone in; activation now follows a
mail that actually left. The verify token minted to render that mail still commits either way — it
is single-use, expires on its own and was mailed nowhere, and the note says so rather than leaving
the next reader to wonder whether it was missed.
Eleven findings survived adversarial verification; these are the fixes.
**Address pre-emption.** S1 dropped the approval-time password revoke, arguing `password_login`
refuses an unverified account before it reads `is_active`. Two verifiers showed that holds only
while the address stays unverified — and S6's approval mail exists to get the real owner to end that
state, at which point the squatter's password works. While an address is unverified the NEWEST
registration now owns it: the password is replaced and every outstanding verify token deleted, so
the owner takes the row back simply by registering, and a link already in flight cannot confirm it
for anyone else. The residual (an owner who confirms and neither registers nor resets) is logged as
SEC-16 beside SEC-15, where the re-attestation path it needs already lives. The comments that
asserted the old, false invariant now say what actually guards this.
**The entry URL.** S2 moved `clearEntryUrl()` out of the signed-out auth card into a hook App mounts
unconditionally, and it blanket-stripped the whole query string, the fragment and `history.state` on
the FIRST commit. That broke first-run setup outright — the wizard mounts only after its query
resolves and then finds no `?token=` — and silently ate `?link=`/`?oauth=` (no toast, no refetch
after connecting Google), `?v=`/`?chan=` deep links, and scroll restoration. It now clears only the
fragment and the two one-time flags it owns, and preserves `history.state`.
**The env allow-list.** S3 canonicalised the Invite branch of `is_allowed` and left the
ALLOWED_EMAILS/ADMIN_EMAILS fallback matching literally — the 2026-09-03 lockout with a different
source of truth, plus a shadowing trick where an unauthenticated request under a sibling spelling
permanently masked an env grant. Canonical on both sides now, and the same for the delete dialog's
warning and the ADMIN_EMAILS role bootstrap.
**Honest states.** `send_invitation` stamped "I already wrote to them" before a fail-soft background
send; it sends inline and records only what left. The admin-side resend answered `{ok: true}` for a
dropped mail; it now says so. Both also activate/serialize consistently with the other decide paths.
**Correctness sweep.** The 7-day approval link said "expires in 168 hours" — durations render in
days once there is more than one. `_register_account`, `upsert_pending_invite` and `add_invite`
picked among canonical siblings with no ORDER BY and no exact-spelling tie-break, so which account
got the re-send, and whether a denied row was reopened over a pending one, was up to Postgres.
`purge_user` deleted every canonically-equal invite, revoking a surviving sibling account's access.
`ConfirmProvider` wrapped its ReactNode message in a `<p>`. Approving no longer leaves the
stuck-sign-ups list stale. The refusal panels announce and take focus.
**Tests.** Three mailers rewritten this epic never rendered in any test; every `send_*` now renders
in both languages. The orphan-key guard could not fail (it scanned the catalog that defines the
keys) and had no reverse direction. Newly pinned: canonical activation, the surviving sibling's
grant, a failed invitation and resend, an expired reset link, a throttled login's silence, the
per-language admin fan-out, and that the entry URL keeps what it does not own.
Twelve mails carried hardcoded English while the app itself has enforced HU/EN parity since E5.
A mail is the one user-facing surface nobody can re-render by switching the UI language: it arrives
once, in whatever language we picked, and stays that way. That made the epic's own headline mail —
"one mail, one click" — English for a Hungarian reader.
The text moved to a catalog (`mailtext.py`) with a `text(key, lang, **vars)` renderer, and the parity
rule is now a test rather than a habit: every key must carry both languages AND the same
`{placeholders}`. A translation that drops `{link}` sends a mail with no link in it; one that invents
a placeholder raises inside a background task nobody is watching. Both are silent in production.
Every `send_*` takes the language as its second argument, resolved by the REQUEST handler and never
inside the mail — these all run as background tasks, after the request's session is gone, which is
the same reason the approval mail computes its link in the handler.
Where the language comes from, in order: the account's own preference; failing that, the language the
person asked us in; failing that, English. The middle one is new — `invites.lang`, migration `0082` —
because the mails an access request produces go to an address that usually has no account yet, and
the signal does exist: the page their form was submitted from, or the locale Google reported for a
sign-in we refused. Captured rather than derived, for the third time in this epic (`google_email` in
S3, `preferences.language` in S6 taught the same lesson): a signal that exists only in one moment
cannot be backfilled later. So the admin is asked in exactly one place — the invitation to an address
they typed in themselves, where nobody has ever told us anything.
That send is now a dialog rather than a bare click, which is also where the "you already wrote to
them" warning belongs — it used to live only in a tooltip the admin may never hover, guarding the one
action whose failure mode is mailing a real person twice.
S6's registration `lang` field turned out to be dead on arrival: the backend accepted it, the
frontend never sent it, so every account has been storing nothing. The request builders now stamp the
UI language themselves — a signal that has to be passed in by every caller is one every caller can
forget, which is exactly how it shipped unset.
Admins are notified one mail per language group instead of one blast to everyone. They are people
with their own UI language; a single message would have to pick one of them and be wrong for the rest.
Also removes a duplicated `invited_at` column declaration on `Invite` (two identical definitions
landed in S6).
The funnel's common ordering made a person open TWO messages: one saying their access was approved,
another asking them to confirm their address. The approval mail now branches on what they actually
still have to do — carry the confirmation link, point at sign-in, or say a confirmation mail follows
once they register — so the usual case is one mail and one click. A mail that guesses wrong is worse
than a plain one: telling someone to sign in while their address is unconfirmed contradicts the
screen that will refuse them.
That embedded link lives 7 days rather than the usual 24 hours. Nobody sits waiting for an approval —
it can easily be read on Monday after a weekend, and an expired link spends the one-mail promise and
puts them back on two. The risk is small: the token only ever confirms an address; it signs nobody in
and sets no password.
The most likely root cause of the 2026-09-03 report that a confirmation mail "never arrived" is here
too, and it was never a delivery failure: re-registering an address that already had an unconfirmed
account returned in SILENCE — same cheerful "check your inbox", no mail sent at all. It now re-sends
the link. Nothing new leaks: the response and its timing are unchanged, and the public verify/resend
already does exactly this for the same input.
Whitelisting stays silent, and that is a decision, not an omission. The operator opens a door as a
possibility — usually already agreed with the person — and a row can sit approved for weeks with
nobody registering; a mail fired automatically there would be nudging someone who never asked.
Telling them is its own act on its own button, `invited_at` records it so a second click is a
decision rather than an accident, and the button only appears where nobody is behind the address yet:
"the door is open, come in" is meaningless to someone already inside.
Two things UAT caught that no test would have. Every fresh registration appeared in BOTH admin lists
at once, because the stuck-sign-ups filter keyed on "unconfirmed" — the rule is now "the address may
sign in, and this account still can't", which leaves an undecided request with the queue that owns
it. And the invitation button was offered on every approved row, half of which are existing users.
Also: the confirmation mail finally says what its link's rules are (once, 24 hours) — the reset mail
always has, while this one left the reader to discover both by meeting a dead link. The card's
"didn't get the email?" moves up under the form, and the three waiting messages name the spam folder,
which is where a first message to a fresh recipient sometimes lands.
Registration now records the language the sign-up page was in. Nothing reads it yet — the bilingual
templates are S7 — but it is the only moment that choice exists anywhere the server can see, and a
preference nobody recorded cannot be backfilled later.
UAT on localdev: re-registering re-sent the link (one token became two, one account); approval issued
a 7-day token and moved the account into the stuck list with only a re-send; whitelisting mailed
nobody; the invitation recorded itself and the row then warned that sending again would write twice.
Test data removed.
Approve an address BEFORE the person registers and their sign-up produces no queue row at all —
`_decide` only takes a still-pending invite — so the Access-requests screen sat empty, the tab badge
read zero, and the only working move was re-typing the address into the whitelist box. Nobody would
guess that, and on 2026-09-03 nobody did.
This is roadmap UX-25, where two earlier attempts were reverted after review. Both moved AUTHORITY:
auto-activating on registration turns a standing whitelist entry into a bearer grant for whoever
registers the address first, and reopening the approved invite to `pending` lets an anonymous sign-up
REVOKE a standing approval. What was actually missing was visibility, so this changes nothing about
what an unauthenticated caller can cause — the admin could already do exactly this by re-entering the
address; they just had no way to know they had to.
The section lists every account that cannot sign in yet and says WHICH gate is shut, because the two
dead ends look the same from the admin's chair: waiting for activation, or waiting on a confirmation
mail. Naming the unconfirmed ones is not decoration — on a no-SMTP instance that is the difference
between the owner and whoever registered the address first (SEC-15), and an admin about to let
someone in should see it. A person the queue above already covers is deliberately NOT listed here;
two buttons for one person is worse than one.
Activate is gated on `is_allowed` — the same function the sign-in paths consult, in core, so the
button that appears and the badge that counts cannot disagree. Without that gate it would
manufacture an inconsistent account: password sign-in only checks `is_active` and would let them in,
while their Google sign-in would be turned away and silently reopened as a fresh access request.
Letting in someone with no approved invite stays the whitelist box's job, which says so out loud.
The badge counts activations SEPARATELY from pending invites rather than widening an existing
field's meaning, and only counts what genuinely waits on the admin: an unconfirmed account waits on
its owner, so it is listed with a re-send but does not nag. The admin-side resend says plainly what
happened, including refusing when the instance has no working SMTP — mail is fail-soft everywhere
else, and that silence is exactly what left the 0.78.5 sign-ups with nothing to fall back on.
`send_verification_link` is now one function with three callers (registration, the public resend,
this one), so the link's shape and TTL cannot drift by who triggered it.
UAT on localdev, both languages: the UX-25 shape reproduced end to end (approve the address, then
register), the badge counting it, Activate letting them in and dropping the badge, the row losing
its Activate but keeping the re-send, a fresh token issued by the re-send, and both actions in the
audit log. Test data removed.
Gmail delivers x.y@, xy@ and xy+tag@ to one inbox; the invite gate only lowercased.
On 2026-09-03 that turned an approved user's Google sign-in into a silent SECOND
access request -- OAuth returns the account's stored primary, which need not be the
spelling they typed -- and left prod with two user rows for one mailbox (ids 13, 14).
The +tag case fails every time: a Google account cannot contain +, so OAuth can only
ever answer with the base address.
Mail still goes to the address AS TYPED; only identity matching uses the canonical
form. utils.canonical_email is the single definition, and a model validator derives
users.email_canonical / invites.email_canonical on every write, so no call site can
forget it. Scope is narrow on purpose: dots are significant on most providers and the
Gmail rule does not hold for Workspace custom domains.
Swept every sibling of the same principle, not just the reported one: is_allowed,
upsert_pending_invite, the Google-callback adoption, _register_account (so no new
duplicate pair can be created), _activate_user_by_email, admin _accounts_for (an
invite backing a live user under another spelling used to look deletable) and
add_invite, plus purge_user, which now erases every canonically-equal invite instead
of leaving one behind that still grants access.
Migration 0079 backfills both columns and indexes them NON-uniquely: prod already
carries canonical duplicates (approved invite pairs since 2026-06-16), and merging
accounts is a judgement call about people's data, not something a migration does on
its own. A test pins the backfill SQL against the Python helper.
SEC-10 revoked any password set while an account's email was unverified, on both
the Google-adoption and the admin-approval path. On the approval path that was
redundant: password_login refuses an unverified account before it ever reads
is_active, so approval hands a pre-emptor's password nothing it could use. All the
revoke achieved there was destroying the password a legitimate registrant had just
chosen -- and since the admin normally decides before the user reads their mail,
'your password was cleared for security' was the DEFAULT experience, not an edge
case. The guard stays on the Google-adoption path, where the real owner does attest
ownership.
password_reset_required and the ok_reset banner stay: accounts stripped on prod
before this change have no other way back in.
Two existing tests pinned the old rule, so they are rewritten rather than deleted,
and the SEC-10 recovery pack now builds the revoked state through the surviving
producer.
Round 2 on the feature diff (15 → 12):
- still_allowed_by_env now rides the invite LIST as well as the delete response,
so the confirmation warns while the admin can still change their mind. It
mattered most for a DENIED row on an env-allow-listed address: deleting it
silently converted a refusal into a grant, and the only warning arrived after
the irreversible click.
- Both inbox bodies claimed to name "the most recent" dropped message. The
throttle records the FIRST of each hour and never updates it, so they now say
"one of them", and the not-configured body finally names where to fix it.
- settings.invites.emailOff told the admin they "get no notice when someone
signs up" — rendered directly above the queue that shows exactly that. Only
the email is lost, and it now says so.
- The disabled delete buttons put their reason out of reach: `disabled` drops a
control from the tab order and suppresses its title. Switched to
aria-disabled + preventDefault, the pattern Playlists.tsx already established
for the same reason.
- deleteInvite is quiet, so the 409 the UI handles with a translated toast no
longer also raises the server's English detail as a modal.
- After a completed password reset, Back landed on the reset form again with a
consumed token — the history change made that state reachable. The token is
cleared on success so the reset view stops being the card's root.
- The hu deleteHasAccount named a tab that renders under a different label.
Tests: a dom test for the Access-requests panel covering both has_account
variants and all three delete outcomes, /api/me flag cases, an ADMIN_EMAILS
case, and the env-allowlist test now patches the raw setting so the parsing
stays under test.
Round 1 on the feature diff found 15; the substantive ones:
- The delete control VANISHED on any invite whose address had registered, which
is the ordinary sign-up shape (register writes the User and the pending invite
together). The guard stays broad — that row is the account's approval gate, and
orphaning it strands someone who can then neither sign in nor be approved — but
the control is now a disabled button carrying the reason, on both lists, so an
admin never sees a row silently missing a button its neighbours have.
- Deleting an entry is not always a revoke: is_allowed falls back to the env
ALLOWED_EMAILS / ADMIN_EMAILS lists once no row exists, and an ADMIN_EMAILS
address is force-promoted on its next Google sign-in. The route now reports
still_allowed_by_env and the UI says so instead of claiming access was removed.
- "Deny keeps the row so they can't immediately re-ask" was simply false —
upsert_pending_invite reopens a denied row. Corrected everywhere it was stated.
- The Configuration warning reads me.email_configured, which save() did not
invalidate, so it kept warning about fields the admin had just filled in.
- The read-only variant was an aria-hidden span explained only by a Tooltip that
the hints toggle can switch off; now a disabled button with title + aria-label.
- The delete error path threw away the 409's reason (the stale-list case) and
left the stale row on screen.
- The throttle window was spent even when no notice was written, silencing the
next hour on the path whose job is to stop silent drops.
- email_enabled() opened a second session and decrypted the SMTP password on
every /api/me poll; it now takes the caller's session.
- welcomeMode.dom.test.ts never rendered the card, so reverting the history
wiring to useState left it green. A render test now drives the real links and
fails on that revert (verified).
Plus /api/me flag tests, the registration-shaped pending case, the env-allowlist
case, and a release note that matches what the code does.
Three operator gaps, all found the same way — a person could not sign up and the
app showed nobody anything.
- DELETE /api/admin/invites/{id} with a delete control on both the pending
requests and the previously-decided list. Deny keeps the row so the person
cannot immediately re-ask; delete forgets the address. Refused with 409 while
a User row exists for it, because is_allowed reads that row and removing it
would revoke a live user's access with no other sign — the list ships
has_account so the UI withholds the button instead of offering one that fails.
- Email is fail-soft by design, which had come to mean invisible. _send() now
records an email_undelivered notification for every admin when a message is
skipped or rejected, naming the message that was lost, throttled to one an
hour. /api/me carries email_configured, driving a standing warning on
Configuration → Email / SMTP and above the access-request list.
- The sign-in card's Create account / Forgot password / Didn't get the email
views are history entries (useHistorySubview), so Back returns to the previous
view instead of only moving the address bar.
Also: the per-test rate-limiter reset sweeps every loaded app.* module rather
than a hand-kept list of three — this change added a limiter outside it.
Review round on the whole E1 stack (main..HEAD). 6 findings, all low/medium,
none blocking; fixed for a clean gate-green handoff.
- plex/sync (correctness): the un-enriched cast guard compared the stored cast
against THIS listing's length, so a trimmed Plex cast on a not-yet-enriched
row was never applied. Compare against the listing CAP (_LISTING_CAST_CAP=20)
instead: >cap = enriched (keep, survives a watermark reset), <=cap =
listing-sourced (track edits in both directions). +2 regression tests.
- main (security): add X-Frame-Options: DENY as the legacy-browser fallback for
the CSP frame-ancestors clickjacking guard.
- downloads/service (altitude): finalize_if_running now uses a SQLAlchemy 2.0
update() construct instead of a hand-built text() UPDATE string — same atomic
WHERE status='running', idiomatic, no identifier interpolation, no manual
StrEnum coercion. Drops the now-unused text import.
- auth/admin (reuse): extract the SEC-10 "drop untrusted preset password + bump
epoch" invariant into one helper (revoke_preset_password_if_unverified) so the
Google-callback and admin-activation paths can't drift.
- tests/migrations (robustness): guarantee the shared schema is restored to head
in a finally, so a downgrade/re-upgrade failure can't cascade into later tests.
- worker (simplification): align _finish_from_cache's display_name fill with the
_download path's guard (no behavior change).
Gate green: ruff clean, 334 pytest (0 skip), frontend unchanged.
SEC-10 (account pre-emption / "pre-hijack"): a password set on an account whose
email was never verified is untrusted — whoever registered the address (to
pre-empt the real owner) could have chosen it. Both the Google-adoption callback
and admin activation (_activate_user_by_email) now drop that pre-set password and
bump the session epoch when the account isn't email_verified, so a later Google
login / admin approval can't hand the pre-set password a working login. No-op for
a verified account (the legit no-SMTP flow). +2 tests.
SEC-11 (link/upgrade bound to the session default): the OAuth link/upgrade GETs
resolved to the session DEFAULT account, so a tab acting as a secondary account
would link Google / the YouTube grant to the wrong account. The frontend now
threads the active account through the navigation URL (withActiveAccount ->
?account=<active>), and _complete_link accepts any wallet account, not only the
default, so the identity lands on the account that started the flow.
Layering cleanup, no behaviour change (ruff clean backend+scripts, pytest 193):
- Invert the scheduler->routes dependency: reset_demo_state (+ its demo-seed
helpers) move from routes/admin.py to a new service module app/demo.py.
Both routes/admin.py and scheduler.py now import it from app.demo, so the
scheduler no longer reaches into the routes layer — its lazy import (the
routes<->scheduler cycle workaround) is gone, hoisted to a top-level import.
- Publish the private symbols that were imported across module boundaries (the
underscore convention was lying): feed._serialize -> serialize,
feed._to_tsquery_str -> to_tsquery_str, videos._insert_stubs -> insert_stubs,
videos._stub_from_playlist_item -> stub_from_playlist_item,
worker._uploader_url -> uploader_url, plex._shared._item_or_404 ->
item_or_404. Scoped renames — the 5 other route modules keep their own truly
private _serialize helpers.
- _release_asset moves from routes/downloads.py to app/downloads/service.py as
the public release_asset (asset bookkeeping is a service concern); the routes
call it via service.release_asset.
- admin._decide: add an idempotency guard (409 unless status was 'pending') so a
repeat/stale approve OR deny can't re-run its side effects — now that deny emails,
this stops duplicate denial mails and a rejection mail to an already-approved user.
- SavedViewsWidget: extract runViewMutation(fn, failMsg) (returns success) — dedups
the five try/catch+refresh blocks AND lets create/rename close their input only on
success, so a failed create keeps the user's typed name.
- worker._notify_download_done: take user_id/title captured BEFORE the caller's commit
(no post-commit refresh SELECT); add a so the inbox labels an edit job
'Edit ready' instead of 'Download ready' (new inbox.editDone i18n, HU+EN).
Gate green (ruff/tsc/eslint-0/prettier/knip/vitest 79/pytest 193); smoke-tested the
saved-views + notifications surfaces render clean on a fresh dev server.
Give equal-weight actions equal-weight feedback (R11).
S1 Plex error toasts: the watched-toggles (card / season mark-all / episode /
info-panel / show mark-all) used to fail silently on 403/404/429; each now surfaces
the server reason via a shared notifyActionError() + resyncs the optimistic flip.
The playback auto-mark-watched stays intentionally silent (a mid-play toast is
noise; the next sync corrects it). New generic lib/actionErrors.ts (Plex + saved
views reuse it; notifyYouTubeActionError delegates its non-403 case to it).
S2 download-done inbox notification: worker.py emits a best-effort type=download_done
notice to the job owner on real completion (regular + edit jobs, not instant
cache-hits), rendered/localized in the inbox with an Open-Downloads link.
S3 optimistic rollbacks: SavedViewsWidget create/rename/toggle-default/remove/reorder
and the inbox revert-state no longer swallow failures — they toast + refetch to
resync (the reorder's optimistic order reverts to server truth).
S4 access-request deny: deny_invite now emails the requester (send_access_denied),
mirroring approve — no more silent limbo.
- setup: SetupAdminIn (KILLS the 3rd named 500 — a non-string password reaching
argon2/len()), SetupTestEmailIn; setup_config stays a typed dict[str, Any] (a
genuinely dynamic key→value settings map, not a fixed schema).
- admin: AddInviteIn / SetRoleIn / SetSuspendedIn / AddDemoWhitelistIn. The
role/status business-rule 400s are unchanged; type errors are now 422.
All 3 ROADMAP-named 500-producers now fixed (channels priority + tag_id, setup
password). Gate: ruff clean, pytest 164 green.
Establish the R6 API-contract infra before the S1b payload:dict migration:
- iso(dt) in utils.py replaces the ~16 hand-rolled `x.isoformat() if x else None`
serializer idioms across the routes.
- get_or_404 / owned_or_404 in routes/_common.py — one 404 + existence-leak policy;
plex's _own_playlist_or_404 and saved_views' _own_view now delegate to it.
- require_write_scope dependency in auth.py collapses the inline has_write_scope→403
checks (channels subscribe/unsubscribe, playlists push/push-plan) that had drifted
into three different messages into one; the conditional delete_playlist guard stays
inline (its message was already canonical).
No response-shape change (iso == isoformat for a present value). Gate: ruff clean,
pytest 163 green (+ test_utils for iso).
set_user_role (demote) and admin_delete_user counted ALL admins incl. suspended
ones, so with e.g. 1 active + 1 suspended admin you could demote/delete the only
ACTIVE admin — leaving a single suspended admin who can never sign in → permanent
admin lockout needing DB surgery. Now both guards mirror the (already-correct)
suspend guard: block only when the target is an active admin AND it's the last one
(`not target.is_suspended and count_admins(active_only=True) <= 1`) — which also
correctly still allows removing a SUSPENDED admin while one active admin remains.
- Live-search results stay ephemeral: the discovery-cleanup job now also reclaims un-kept
via_search videos (no watch state / not playlisted / channel not subscribed) after a grace
period (search_grace_days), and POST /api/search/clear discards a given result set 'as if
never added' (drops the user's search-finds + deletes the now-orphaned, un-kept videos).
Admin POST /api/admin/purge-discovery runs it on demand (grace 0).
- Count selector: GET /api/search/youtube gains a 'limit' — the free scrape source pages
through continuations until that many results are gathered (no manual load-more); the API
source stays one ≤50 page (cost).
- Per-user channel blocklist (migration 0034 blocked_channels): block/unblock/list endpoints;
blocked channels' videos are dropped from live search before ingest and hidden from the feed
/ Library / explore / channel page; explore refuses a blocked channel.
- New-first ordering: results you already have (subscribed channel, watched/in-progress/saved/
playlisted) sink below genuinely-new discoveries, preserving relevance within each group.
- app/utils.py: shared valid_email() + now_utc() (one email regex, was duplicated
in auth.py and admin.py with a looser "@"-in check elsewhere).
- security.hash_token(): one SHA-256 token hasher (was duplicated in auth.py + state.py).
- auth.admin_user dependency + count_admins() helper, replacing the inline role
checks and the last-admin count query repeated across admin.py/me.py/tags.py.
- New Users page tabs (Users & roles / Access requests / Demo) and a tab-ified Configuration
page, both via a reusable Tabs component (persisted active tab).
- Admin can suspend/unsuspend (migration 0023 adds users.is_suspended) and delete accounts
from the Users & roles tab, with guards (demo / self / last admin).
- Email notifications to the affected user: suspended (reactive, on a blocked sign-in),
reinstated, role changed, and account deleted; the approval email now carries a clickable
app link. The scheduled/manual demo reset also seeds sample channel subscriptions.
- Hide the 'unverified email' chip for Google accounts (Google attests the email).
A security audit of every mutating endpoint found no isolation gaps — all routes
scope by current_user, admin routes are gated, and the demo account is sandboxed
in its own user_id space (can't reach others' data, escalate, or hit admin
routes). The remaining demo concern is communal pollution of its own shared state,
so add an automatic reset: a new 'demo_reset' scheduler job (admin-tunable
interval, default 12h) reuses the manual reset logic, and no-ops without ever
creating a demo account if none exists. Verified: a triggered run wiped the demo's
video states and re-seeded its sample playlists.
Add email+password auth alongside Google: argon2id hashing; users gains
password_hash/email_verified/is_active and google_sub becomes nullable (migration
0022); a single-use, hashed auth_tokens table for email verification + password
reset. Registration creates a pending (inactive, unverified) account + an access
request; sign-in needs verified email AND admin approval. Anti-enumeration: uniform
register/login/reset responses (a correct-password owner still gets a specific
pending reason). allow_registration flag (DB-tunable). Admin users-list + role
endpoint (guards: not self, not demo, not the last admin); approving access (or a
manual whitelist add) now activates the matching pending account. current_user
rejects deactivated accounts. Verified end-to-end via curl + DB.
Admin endpoints to manage the demo email whitelist (DB-backed, no env)
and a manual reset that wipes the demo account's per-user state and
re-seeds a few sample playlists from the shared catalog.
Move the access whitelist from the ALLOWED_EMAILS env var into a DB Invite table
(env kept as bootstrap fallback), and add a self-service request + admin approval
flow with fail-soft email.
- models: Invite(email, status pending|approved|denied, requested_at, decided_*)
- migration 0008: invites table; seed env ALLOWED_EMAILS u ADMIN_EMAILS as approved
- auth: is_allowed() (DB-first, env fallback); a denied Google login records a pending
request and bounces to /?access=requested instead of a raw 403; public POST
/auth/request-access; upsert is idempotent so repeats don't re-spam admins
- routes/admin.py (admin-only): list/approve/deny invites + manual add
- email.py: smtplib + Gmail App Password, fail-soft (skips if SMTP unset)
- /api/me exposes pending_invites; config + .env.example gain SMTP_*
- UI: Login 'Request access' form + access=requested/denied handling; Settings ->
Access requests (approve/deny + add); admin nudge toast on pending requests
Verified locally: request-access creates a pending invite and emails the admin;
seed approved npeter83; guinea-pig yt.trash2023 denied until approved.
peter